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Abstract: How dangerous is Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) because of the 
state’s influence over business, particularly state-owned enterprises (SOEs)? To what extent are 
business and politics interwoven in Chinese investment decisions? Crucial knowledge is lacking 
on the relationship between the state and companies in China’s OFDI. This study does not claim 
to completely refute the conventional view that Chinese companies, particularly SOEs, are 
controlled by the state in their OFDI activities. However, it tries to provide some evidence that 
suggests the need for a revised look at them. It argues that although Chinese SOEs are supported 
by Chinese diplomacy and loans in their OFDI and have a tacit understanding of certain strategic 
goals of the state, they enjoy autonomy to make business decisions and have prioritized 
maximizing their own business interests. Importantly, this is enabled by the state’s view that the 
profit of SOEs is consistent with national interests. 
 
 
Introduction 
How dangerous is Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) because of the state’s 
influence over business, particularly state-owned enterprises (SOEs)? To what extent are business 
and politics interwoven in Chinese investment decisions?  
 China’s outward investment is growing rapidly, changing the picture of regional and global 
political economy and attracting a great deal of controversy. According to the State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), by the end of 2009, 108 central SOEs 
have invested overseas with a total asset of over 4 trillion RMB (about 600 billion USD) 
(http://ccnews.people.com.cn/GB/15203184.html). The Chinese state-run oil company China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) attempted takeover of Unocal in the USA in 2005 
triggered Congressmen to call it a “Trojan horse” that would enable China to conduct secret 
nuclear tests underground, as well as to obtain control of energy assets of the USA (Pelosi, 2005). 
Other countries remain concerned that China’s sovereign wealth funds and SOEs will continue to 
buy large stakes in publicly listed American companies. Apart from national economic security, 
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many democratic countries are also concerned that China’s state-owned companies, while 
claiming non-interference in domestic affairs of other countries, support regimes guilty of gross 
violations of human rights, such as Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Venezuela, by 
investing heavily in and possibly providing military assistance to those countries. Some observe 
that China may be trying to challenge the dominance of liberal democracy in the world by 
showcasing the merits of China’s liberal economic and authoritarian political model to other 
developing countries, or by trying to establish a “Beijing Consensus” (Jian, 2011). Still others 
suspect that China tries to establish a global “Chinese empire” (Terrill, 2004). At the same time, 
there is concern that China is in a desperate global scramble for control over sources of energy 
and raw materials, thereby posing a threat to international energy security. China’s thirst for 
energy and resources has also caused resource nationalism in other countries, fearing that their 
governments would give up too many resources or resource sovereignty to China so that local 
development would be affected (Burgess and Beilstein, 2013). The preference of Chinese 
companies to use Chinese employees in their overseas projects has been a sensitive political issue 
to the host countries, and China’s pursuit of free movement of labour into the host country has 
been regarded as an attempt of serious intrusion upon national sovereignty (Drysdale and 
Findlay, 2009). The alleged overseas practices of some Chinese companies in corruption, labour 
exploitation, environmental damage and forging have also undermined the reputation of the 
Chinese government. Chinese investment in developing countries has been described as self-
interested, exploitative and colonial (Alden, 2005; Halff, 2007).  
However, crucial knowledge is lacking on the relationship between the state and 
companies in OFDI in general and that of China in particular. This study does not claim to 
completely refute the conventional view that Chinese companies, particularly SOEs, are 
controlled by the state in their OFDI activities. However, it tries to provide some evidence that 
suggests the need for a revised look at them. It argues that although Chinese SOEs are supported 
by Chinese diplomacy and loans in their OFDI and have a tacit understanding of certain 
strategic goals of the state, they enjoy autonomy to make business decisions and have prioritized 
maximizing their own business interests. Importantly, this is enabled by the state’s view that the 
profit of SOEs is consistent with national interests. This view may stem from a combination of 
reasons, including the government’s lack of a coherent long-term OFDI strategy and the fact that 
the state has been captured by big businesses. The failure of some investment decisions in the 
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past and the demand from the companies have led the Chinese government to adopt measures that 
are more market driven and also to bundle together more aid programmes with business projects. 
The rest of the article will review the existing studies, describe the methodology, provide a brief 
background of Chinese policy, and present some empirical findings before a tentative conclusion 
is drawn. 
 
Existing Studies 
It has been pointed out in the existing literature of multinational corporations (MNCs) that 
knowledge is needed on the interplay between home country institutions and firm strategies 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Child and Rodrigues, 2005). The knowledge gap on state-business 
relations is especially critical regarding Chinese OFDI.
1
 Existing literature mainly describes 
Chinese business activities and speculates about the relations with the state (e.g. Cai, 1999; 
Holslag, 2008; Luo and Tung, 2007; Wu and Chen, 2001; Yang, 2005). A few studies have tried 
to fill this gap, but they focus on China’s national policies and the overseas investment behaviour 
of companies (Xue and Han, 2010; Rasiah et al., 2010), rather than the relationship between state 
and business per se.  
In both political-economic theories and business studies on foreign investments, there are 
debates about the significance of nationality (Encarnation, 1999). Is there anything distinctive 
about Chinese investment? The answer is inconclusive among existing studies. Some business 
studies argue that China has developed along the five-stage investment development path as 
modelled by Dunning and Narula (1996), or that it is still at an early stage marked by low 
transnationality and little usage of international financing channels (Xue et al., 2011: 86), while 
others argue that China skipped the first two stages. A more important question, however, is 
whether the investments have been driven entirely in accordance with the comparative advantage 
of the domestic industry. Some argue that traditional explanations for FDIs by developed 
countries apply to China as well, including market seeking, natural resources seeking and, in 
recent years, strategic assets seeking (for technology, brand and distribution channels) (Wong and 
Chan, 2003; Xue et al., 2011). Besides, the rationale of emerging country multinationals also 
applies to China - to avoid domestic competitive disadvantages (Child and Rodrigues, 2005). 
Others argue that Chinese investments are unique. Overseas Chinese businesses depend largely 
on the availability of overseas personal relationship networks and invest in culturally proximate 
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countries (Cai, 1999; Deng, 2004; Yang, 2005; Buckley et al., 2007). They seem to perceive 
political and business risks differently from industrialised country firms, which may reflect 
government influence (Buckley et al., 2007; The Economist, 2010). Or simply, it is asserted or 
assumed that they are driven by the government’s political motivations (for example, Cai, 1999; 
Filipov and Saebi, 2008; Forney, 2005; Friedberg, 2006; Zweig and Bi, 2005). However, reliance 
on personal networks or cultural proximity is a feature of Chinese small and medium enterprises, 
or its early stage of internationalisation; it does not apply to OFDI by SOEs in the 21
st
 century. 
Neither does downplay of local political risk mean being driven by state diplomacy with weak or 
autocratic states. 
The perceptions of state control over SOEs and thus the dominance of political-strategic 
goals behind OFDI are generally based on the following grounds (see for example, The 
Economist, 2010). First, the top management of SOEs is appointed by the Party. The SASAC is 
charged with appointing leadership positions of the 117 national SOEs, and the Central 
Organization Department of the CCP manages 53 of them through a nomenklatura system. The 
system also enables the Party to rotate leaders between companies and between business and state 
institutions (Brødsgaard, 2012). Second, the state is the largest shareholder in many companies 
(Hemerling et al., 2006). Third, OFDI of SOEs is financially supported by state commercial and 
policy banks. Fourth, aid and investment are often packaged together (Gill and Reilly, 2007). 
There are loopholes in such reasoning; as it is unclear which criteria the Party uses to evaluate 
managers, which objectives the state as a shareholder pursues through SOEs, or how SOEs 
become qualified for bank loans or participation in aid projects. For example, Brødsgaard (2012) 
acknowledges that it is unknown how decisions are made on the transfer of business leaders and 
state officials; in particular, very little is known about how leaders of SOEs are selected. 
Some studies have casted doubt on the conviction of the state’s control over China’s 
OFDI, although their voices remain a minority in academic and public opinion. Gill and Reilly 
(2007) characterise state-business relations in China’s investment in Africa as a principal-agent 
dilemma - increasing tensions between the aims of the government and companies. Houser 
(2008) emphasizes the same tension between the state and national oil companies in OFDI. Some 
underline the facts that the commercial pressures on Chinese companies are growing rapidly, and 
that corporate governance in SOEs is increasingly subject to market disciplines (Rosen and 
Hanemann, 2009; Hurst and Wang, 2012; Drysdale and Findlay, 2009). This makes it difficult for 
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the state to directly administer company investment decisions and increasingly defer them to 
professional firm management. Freemantle and Stevens (2012: 3) underline that “more and more 
Chinese activity in Africa has little direct support”. Drysdale and Findlay (2009) underline that 
the terms of Chinese banks when lending to SOEs are increasingly commercially based. Armony 
and Strauss (2012: 8) argue that instead of a “standard view” that Chinese mining companies 
deviate from western ones in their preference to operate in non-democratic contexts, they prefer 
“mature and developed mining economies, geographic proximity and direct dealings with other 
transnational mining companies in lieu of national governments”. Gonzalez-Vicente (2012) 
concurs that Chinese mining companies’ preference for specific countries in Latin America are 
best explained by the strategies and experience of firms rather than by a national strategy dictated 
by the central government. By mapping the formal institutions of Chinese OFDI, Xue and Han 
(2010) argue that the Chinese government changed its role in OFDI from strict control to 
encouragement, approval and supervision. 
Little is established, however, about the nature of state involvement in OFDI by Chinese 
SOEs, in particular the direct interaction between government and companies as well as the 
informal institutions - working mechanisms, decision making, tacit understandings and unwritten 
rules. This gap is acknowledged, and further empirical research from a political economy 
perspective is regarded crucial by existing studies (for example, Armony and Strauss, 2012; 
Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Buckley et al., 2007, Downs, 2007, Kumar and Chadha, 2009; Xue 
and Han, 2010). To be more specific, more knowledge is needed on the extent of state 
interference in company governance and strategic decisions, leniency of bank loans, the reliance 
of business on diplomacy, and business lobbying over China’s OFDI policy and institutions. 
Moreover, there is limited knowledge on whether Chinese OFDI policy consists of a 
development strategy for host developing countries or an agenda to challenge dominant powers 
and the liberal democratic norm (Brautigam, 2009; Jiang, 2011b). 
 
Policy Background 
China’s overall policy towards OFDI has changed from restriction to promotion. From 1979 to 
2000, directed by a national economic strategy that relied on inward FDI and export, and 
constrained by limited foreign reserves, the government did not actively encourage outward 
investment. Although in 1992, the 14
th
 CCP’s Congress laid down the policy to expand Chinese 
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outward investment and international business, in the 1990s only a few domestic companies 
ventured overseas, mainly in the energy and resources sector. For instance, the government took 
little notice of CNPC’s first forays into Peru, Sudan and Kazakhstan until the mid-1990s (Xu 
2007). At the same time, a number of large SOEs were granted greater autonomy over their 
foreign operations (De Beule and Van Den Bulcke, 2010; Xue and Han, 2010).   
The scale and nature of China’s outward investment have changed significantly in the 21st 
century. In 2001, encouraging outward investment became part of the 10
th
 Five Year Plan. 
“Going out” officially became a national strategy in 2002 at the 16th CCP Congress, which was 
described as “concerning comprehensive development and future of national development” in the 
Party’s work report.2 The supportive measures, however, were found to be inadequate by the 
Development Research Center of the State Council, compared with other countries (Wong and 
Chan, 2003). More substantial measures were taken in 2004, when the National Development and 
Reforms Commission (NDRC), with the support of other government agencies, issued a series of 
policy notices on the measures to support “important projects encouraged by the government” to 
investment overseas.
3
 They listed four categories of projects that the government would support: 
first, those that help to obtain important energy and resources; second, those that help to export 
labour and machinery; third, those that help to obtain advanced technology and management 
experiences; and finally, those that help China to participate in the restructuring of global 
production. The measures of support include giving preference in granting licences by the 
NDRC, as well as providing loans and financial insurance, financing support, and establishing 
risk security mechanisms through the China Import & Export Bank, the China Export & Credit 
Insurance Corporation (SinoSure), and the China Development Bank. It was the most determined 
and specific step that the Chinese government had taken to support outward investment. 
Several policy objectives are prominent in the government’s push for outward investment: 
to reduce low-return foreign exchange reserves, to secure a “stable” - long-term and stably priced 
- supply of energy and resources, to obtain advanced technology, to promote Chinese “global 
champions” as a component of national competitiveness and great power status, to circumvent 
trade barriers and reduce competitive and employment pressures in the domestic market, and to 
pursue diplomatic relations with destination countries. The government’s encouragement of 
overseas investment was a response to changing domestic and international conditions. 
Domestically, the development model of the past two decades resulted in problems such as 
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energy shortages, inflationary pressure because huge foreign reserves accumulated from trade 
surpluses, over-capacity in production and an increasingly saturated domestic market, rising 
unemployment and risk of political instability, and slow progress of technology advancement. 
Internationally, the policy to boost overseas investment is a reflection of a more competitive 
international environment, as well as China’s more proactive embrace of globalization and its 
determination to play a major role in the global political economy through “corporate 
representatives” and investment diplomacy. Encouraged by government policy, China’s OFDI 
has since flourished.  
In the global financial crisis, Beijing launched another push for OFDI. The China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) allowed commercial banks to lend money to fund the 
transaction price of M&As. To simplify the approval procedures, the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) published “Administration of Overseas Investment” and NDRC published 
“Working Approval Procedure of Overseas Investment” in 2009.4 By 1 June 2011, China had 
signed 130 bilateral investment treaties and 121 double taxation agreements.
5
 
 
Methodology 
Because there is little documentary data of the state’s role in Chinese OFDI, this study tries to 
break the ground by using case studies and interviews. It focuses on SOEs (majority or entirely 
state-owned) for three reasons. First, they have led the international expansion of Chinese 
companies, entering new territories and carrying out big projects. Second, they rank high in 
China’s top MNEs by foreign assets (Xue et al., 2011). Out of the top 18 MNEs, 16 are SOEs; 
SOEs account for 69 per cent of total Chinese OFDI stock by the end of 2009, and central SOEs 
account for 67.6 per cent of total OFDI flow in 2009.
6
 Third, it is a fact that most private 
enterprises are not controlled by the state and operate according to their business interests. In 
other words, SOEs constitute the hard case here in arguing for business autonomy. 
Two rounds of fieldwork were carried out in July 2009 and September 2010, consisting of 
interviews with involved persons in a few big companies (one of the biggest companies in each 
of the following sectors: telecommunications, construction and petrol), state institutions (NDRC), 
as well as government think tanks (DRC, CICIR, CPS, CASS, CAITEC) and academic 
institutions (UIBE). Therefore, this study is case based, supplemented with anecdotal 
information, and contains the risk of personal or institutional biases. It would also have been 
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advantageous had there been more cases of companies. However, even scant evidence is here 
considered useful for challenging the conventional wisdom mentioned above. 
 
The questions asked to interviewees mainly contain the following aspects: 
1. To what extent is the state involved in the management of Chinese MNCs? 
1a. How large a share does the government hold in the company, and what are the ownership as 
well as the governance structures of the company in general?  
1b. Where do companies get funding for OFDI? How do state banks examine loans applications 
for OFDI?  
1c. To what extent does the government control the personnel and other management decisions 
of the company? 
2. To what extent are Chinese OFDI driven by strategic purposes of the state or by pure 
commercial goals of the companies? 
2a. To what extent does the company rely on government diplomatic relations to establish or 
expand business? 
2b. What is the proportion of natural resources that the company sells in the global market 
instead of bringing back to China (in the case of a resource company)? 
2c. To what extent does the company take into account state strategic demands in investment 
decisions? 
3. To what extent can companies influence the government’s policy or even induce change in 
the domestic institutions related to OFDI? 
3a. How do companies try to lobby the government in granting them favourable policies for 
OFDI or even change the regulations? 
3b. What do companies think that the Chinese government should change? 
 
Empirical Findings 
Application procedures of OFDI 
Only applications of projects with the usage of foreign currency of above 10 million USD, or 30 
million USD in resource projects, need central government approval (see Figure 1). The 
application system is also changing from one of approval to one of registration. 
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Figure 1: Application Procedures of Chinese OFDI (source: author’s own compilation based on 
interviews). 
 
A few characteristics can be noted from the OFDI application procedure before going into more 
detailed discussions of individual elements.  
First, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) does not play a formal role in the approval 
process of OFDI. As will be discussed later, MFA supports business through building business 
connections, providing local information and sometimes diplomatic pressure on the host country 
government or companies.  
Second, the Organization Department of the Party and the SASAC are not directly 
involved in the approval process. As will be discussed in the next section, SASAC prioritizes the 
increase of value of state assets, and it only tries to strengthen supervision when companies make 
substantial losses. In June 2011, in response to scandalous losses that some central SOEs have 
made in their overseas investment in recent years, SASAC came up with two policy documents to 
strengthen supervision and reduce the risk of state asset losses 
(http://www.cssn.cn/news/379081.htm). 
Third, the most decisive agencies in the procedure are NDRC and MOFCOM, both of 
which are mainly concerned with national economic interests rather than foreign policy interests. 
Chinese company
MFA
foreign company
NDRC
MOFCOM
banksSAFE
SASAC
CCP
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NDRC checks proposals of OFDI projects that are worth above 10 million USD to see if they are 
consistent with the national development plan (interview at NDRC). MOFCOM checks the 
contract to make sure it does not conflict with domestic law or China’s international treaties and 
that it does not harm bilateral relations. However, as Gill and Reilly (2007) point out, MOFCOM 
does not have direct authority over either SOEs or their overseas operations. Although SASAC is 
the “owner” of SOEs, as mentioned above, it only supervises SOEs to prevent serious loss after 
investment has been made. Therefore, NDRC plays a stronger role in vetting proposals from 
strategic sectors where many SOEs operate. As a “super-ministry” overseeing national 
development, it has a few concerns within national security broadly defined - energy security and 
food security. This certainly translates into an encouraging policy for overseas scrambles for 
commodities, but there does not seem to exist any specific policy on the choice of investment 
destination or quota of how many resources the companies have to bring home. 
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) has ample foreign reserve and 
puts little constraint on its usage in OFDI. 
Fourth, big mergers or acquisitions often start with companies negotiating between 
themselves, and only when they have come to an agreement do they apply for government 
approval, as was the case with CNOOC and Unacol (interview at NDRC). SOEs usually conduct 
a feasibility study, sometimes hiring external consulting firms, to examine the profitability of the 
potential investment. One problem is that consulting firms sometimes collude with the target 
company (interview at a telecom company). 
 
The State’s Control over SOEs in general 
In contrast to a general belief that the Chinese party state controls SOEs by appointing top 
managers and granting financial support (The Economist, 2010; Gill and Reilly, 2007; 
Brødsgaard, 2012), it is argued here that the state has been captured by business interests. In 
today’s China, the government and regulators are captured by the big SOEs. Their perceived role 
in managing state assets and providing employment is extremely important to the state, and they 
have successfully stalled reform in major areas of China’s economic life in the past decade. 
The political power of SOEs rose together with their economic positions in the past 
decade - their profitability is questionable, but their sheer size bespeaks their weight. After its 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China gave up earlier unilateral liberalisation 
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and adopted a strong industrial policy with the ostensible aim of developing national industries 
and global champions, just as the model of the developmental state prescribes. Under the Hu-
Wen government, thanks to industrial policy, fiscal subsidy, preferential bank loans and the 
restructuring of SOEs as large oligarchs, the state’s monopoly over some sectors has intensified.  
Indeed the top managers of central SOEs are appointed by the Department of 
Organisation of the Party. The Department of Organisation and SASAC, however, consider the 
size, assets and especially the profitability of the enterprise when they evaluate and appoint top 
SOE managers (author’s various interviews in Beijing in 2011). A major mechanism of state 
control over SOEs is the annual evaluation of enterprises and their managers by SASAC. The 
SASAC’s power in the Chinese political system has risen significantly in recent years, 
particularly in relation to their overseeing authority over SOEs. According to various 
interviewees, the main criterion for said evaluation is their ability to keep and increase the value 
of state assets, as stated in the Mission of SASAC.
7
 The same goal applies to SOE’s overseas 
investment. In other words, profitability, or at least the ability to earn profit, is an extremely 
important goal for SOEs (also see Gill and Reilly, 2007). The manager of China Steel, Huang 
Tianwen, had to resign because of losses made in excessive overseas expansion. SASAC used 
this case to warn other SOEs in the same sector (MinMetals and China Railway Materials) 
against similar business behaviour (interview at DRC, also see 
http://finance.591hx.com/article/2011-07-04/0000044495s.shtml). Chen Jiulin of China National 
Aviation Fuel and Rong Zhijian of CITIC Pacific were also penalized for their loss-making 
speculation in overseas financial derivatives (http://www.sinotf.com/GB/News/1001/2011-07-
27/2NMDAwMDA3MjU2Nw.html).  
Among the CEOs of central SOEs, a significant portion have risen up the ladders in the 
same sector, accumulated technical and business knowledge, and demonstrated their business 
capabilities. Among the 122 selected appointees from 2003 to 2011, 51 came from the same 
enterprise or the same sector, 57 came from other SOEs, and only 4 were rotated from a 
government position (Beijing News, 2011). In 2013, 56.7 per cent or 64 of CEOs of 113 central 
SOEs were chosen from within the company. Among them, vice-ministerial rank SOEs have a 
higher proportion of CEOs from the same enterprise (59.6 per cent) or enterprises in the same 
sector (21.2 per cent) (Xinwenhua, 2013). 42 per cent of 122 open-hiring positions of executive 
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managers at SOEs from 2003 to 2011 were taken by candidates in the same enterprise, and 47 per 
cent from other SOEs (Beijing News, 2011).  
Even when managers are selected to change to political positions, the choice has been 
based on their performance. According to SASAC, parachuting some top SOE managers to take 
leadership of local governments is a trend and experiment in Chinese politics. The managerial 
skills and market perspectives of those managers are considered complementary to traditional 
government administrators (China Times, 2011). Only in extraordinary conditions are SOE 
managers’ “political loyalty” questioned, for instance if they are involved in scandals or have 
shown inability to deal with labour unrest.
8
 
A number of studies have shown the increasing independence and political clout that 
SOEs enjoy in Chinese domestic politics, thanks to government institutional reform, the 
perceived role they play in employment and the national economy, and the informal political 
ranking of SOE managers (see, for example, Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Nolan, 2001; 
Downs, 2008). In recent years, major initiatives of reform were stalled or pushed back because of 
resistance from SOEs and state commercial banks, including recent efforts of financial reform, 
reform of income distribution and legislation to curtail monopolies. Financial suppression — 
heavy taxation on savers and subsidies to SOEs and state commercial banks —has been a 
cornerstone of the development model, and “2009 marked the end of banking reform as advanced 
since 1998” (Lardy 2008, Walter and Howie 2011: 76). Initiatives to reform income distribution 
have been thwarted repeatedly because of resistance from vested interests, in particular from 
SOEs to a proposal to break up monopolies, according to people involved in the internal 
discussions. In response to public criticism, SASAC claimed that they did not have control over 
this matter (Chen, 2013). Similarly, the Anti-Monopoly Law, which entered into force in 2008, 
exempted sectors monopolised by SOEs. Explaining such phenomena, Gao Shangquan, former 
Director of the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System that existed from 1982 
to 1998, was quoted as saying that, compared with current conditions for reform, reform in the 
1980s had a lot of momentum and few objections, and the leadership had authority then (Teng, 
2013). 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that SOEs enjoy significant autonomy in their business 
decisions, sometimes in defiance of the government’s orders during the financial crisis, for 
example, to stop risky financial derivatives businesses, to allow non-property companies to exit 
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the real estate market, to allow more room for private businesses and to limit the salaries of SOE 
managers (see, for example, Jiang, 2009; Zheng, 2010; Zhong, 2011). Such defiant behaviour 
demonstrates that the pursuit of profit is extremely important for SOE managers, not only for 
their business careers or potential political careers, but also for their short-term personal wealth. 
Some SOEs are also under the supervision of the relevant industrial ministries (for 
example, telecommunications, construction, transportation, and railways until March 2013), 
which have their own interest, and local SOEs are managed or supported by local governments. 
Industrial ministries and local governments are certainly interested in maintaining their regulatory 
power over SOEs, as this produces leverage and rent. At the same time, the ministries try to 
maintain state oligopolies, their shares in the domestic market provide guidance on pricing and 
ensure the state’s tax revenue. For instance, Unicom and China Mobile have been the two biggest 
telecom oligopolies, and when one pushes the other too much in domestic market competition, 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) would intervene and stop the 
winner from predacious activities (interview at a telecom SOE). However, the effectiveness of 
such intervention is questionable. Since government units rely on their SOEs for revenue, 
employment and performance in political competition, they are sometimes taken hostage by 
SOEs and act as their representatives. The two telecom companies engaged in price wars in 2001 
despite a ban by MIIT and the State Planning Agency in 1999 (http://book.sina.com.cn/2003-04-
24/3/5274.shtml). Similar competition is seen between Sinopec and CNPC, only these two 
compete to buy oil and result in price hikes in the domestic market 
(http://book.sina.com.cn/2003-04-24/3/5275.shtml). The capacity of ministries to supervise or 
intervene in companies’ overseas business activities is even weaker.  
In short, the criteria for evaluating SOE managers reflect the overall strategic purpose of 
the Chinese state for its overseas investment, which will be discussed later. Rather than the 
widely held assumption that China uses FDI to, first of all, challenge a neoliberal world order and 
build diplomatic alliances with enemies of the West, the pursuit of economic benefits (based on 
China’s comparative advantage) is more important. It also shows that the state currently does not 
distinguish SOE’s interests from the state’s interest and presumes that profitability of SOEs is of 
interest to the nation. 
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Funding 
State financial support – subsidies and easy access to loans – is one of the major reasons for the 
widely held argument that SOEs are foreign policy tools and do not play by market rules in 
OFDI. Indeed, the state is the biggest investor and shareholder in SOEs, and the success of 
zhengqi fenkai (separation of the government as investor from the management of enterprises) in 
SOE reform has been questioned. However, as mentioned earlier, SASAC and a few industrial 
ministries represent the state to invest in SOEs and they pursue economic gains above all. Two 
other qualifications should be added to that line of argument. 
First, SOEs often use their own funding for OFDI activities, without applying for loans 
for each project. It may come from overseas listing of a subsidiary, direct support from the 
domestic headquarters, or money that the company earned overseas by way of reinvestment. For 
instance, Chinese oil companies, in most cases, do not need external capital to finance their 
overseas investment (Houser, 2008). 
Second, state commercial banks have their own set of rules for loans and they are quite 
strict. They understand the general policy of the state to encourage “going out” in several 
categories of activities, but they also have much autonomy in carrying out commercial 
assessment. The China Banking Regulatory Commission requires banks to have strict rules for 
OFDI loans, and loans are given to projects with good business prospects, although lack of 
experience and local information is considered the reason for the losses of many projects 
(interviews at CAITEC, a telecom company and a construction company). 
The state policy banks – the China Development Bank (CDB) and Ex-Im Bank – naturally 
support state strategic goals. CDB states that it supports enterprises in going out to obtain oil, 
natural gas, metal and mineral resources, as well as in diplomacy -- it supports infrastructure and 
agricultural-forestry projects in countries with important diplomatic relations, mainly in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. At the same time, the CDB emphasizes its success in business terms 
and its brining profit to the shareholders (Ministry of Finance and Central Huijin Investment 
Company Ltd).
9
 
Third, it is not only SOEs that receive state support. Private companies followed SOEs in 
the wave of overseas investment, and they received little government support initially. But the 
government is beginning to redress the matter by supporting successful companies such as 
Huawei and ZTE. These successful private Chinese companies, particularly those figuring on the 
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Fortune 500 list, are considered “national champions”, and receive government support in the 
form of R&D, funding, and help with market exploration. Business success is an important 
consideration in the government and banks’ decision of giving support (interview at CPS, DRC). 
 
The Role of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 
Without doubt, China’s push for going out has political strategic considerations. Some regions 
such as Asia and Africa are considered important targets for diplomacy and therefore investment 
is encouraged there.  
When China initiated its “going out” policy in the late 1990s, the state selectively pushed 
a few SOEs to invest overseas. For instance, former CEO of CNOOC, Fu Chengyu, was often 
called upon by the State Council to discuss acquiring mines overseas, including in Indonesia 
(interview at CCPS, 2011). 
When Wu Jianmin was Ambassador to France (1998-2003), he found that Chinese 
companies there needed support and resources from the government, because local nationalism 
and unfamiliarity with laws hindered their success. For example, when the negotiation between a 
French airplane parts manufacturer and a Chinese company were in a deadlock over price, Wu 
met with the manager of the French company and told him not to focus only on this bill of 
business. Rather, he should have a long-term view and give some concessions this time for future 
benefits. Then the French company gave concessions. Wu was inspired by Henry Kissinger who, 
after retirement from diplomacy, started a consulting company to help companies. Wu visited the 
consulting company in the 1980s (interview at CCPS). 
Partly thanks to Wu’s advocacy of diplomatic support to Chinese companies, the 
government started to implement a strategy of going out in different regions of the world around 
2002, including Africa, Asia, Western Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Russia and 
developed countries. As going out was considered part of economic diplomacy, Chinese 
embassies started to actively study existing opportunities in the host countries, especially if the 
country is an important target for going out or economic diplomacy. They provide information 
and legal consultation to Chinese companies, and use their local government and business 
networks to facilitate business (interview at CCPS). 
Apart from supporting company initiatives, embassies would come up with proposals of 
sectors in the host country that would constitute an investment potential for Chinese companies, 
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and then invite domestic companies in those sectors to consider the opportunities. MOFCOM 
also leads “shopping delegations” to other countries in the same fashion whereby MOFCOM 
plans sectors and invite companies. Then MOFCOM obtains agreement from the MFA and 
submits the proposal of delegation to the State Council for approval (interview at CCPS). 
The Chinese government cannot monitor the local behaviour of all Chinese companies 
including SOEs. Therefore poor labour and safety standards, exploitation of natural resources and 
the tendency to hire Chinese workers are amongst the reasons that China is labelled as neo-
imperialist or neo-colonialist. As Downs (2007) reports, MFA often struggles to keep abreast of 
investments that have already occurred. The Chinese government became aware of this criticism 
in 2005, and at the 2006 Central Working Meeting on Foreign Affairs, it was stated that China 
should consider the partner countries’ interests while pursuing economic benefits. The 
government can only pick examples for occasional review and correction of such image, such as 
in Africa. One indirect way is to alleviate debt of those countries, and another way is through the 
investigation by Chinese embassies over Chinese companies there (interview at CCPS). Over the 
past three years, MOFCOM and MFA have formed working groups, which have dealt with many 
cases of irresponsible local behaviour of Chinese companies (interview at UIBE, 2011). 
In short, with regards to the extent of state strategic influence over business, SOEs’ OFDI 
is seen by the government as part of economic diplomacy, and SOEs in strategic sectors receive 
diplomatic support to pursue business interests, as the latter are seen as being consistent with the 
state’s interest. In particular, overseas investment of all central SOEs can get support from the 
State Council because they are in strategic sectors. It should be noted, however, that the state 
largely plays a supportive role rather than being a mastermind that directs business decisions, as 
will be discussed in the next subsection. 
 
Business Decisions 
The search for investment opportunities and choice of destination are normally carried out by 
enterprises, as the government is not considered as having adequate information about local 
business environment, and companies are responsible for their own profit or loss (interview at 
CASS, DRC, a construction company and a petrol company). Contact with the target host 
country or company is also usually initiated by companies. There are two exceptions. First, as 
mentioned earlier, MFA investigates local business opportunities and invite domestic companies 
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to consider. Second, MOFCOM invites domestic bidders to participate in official aid 
programmes. In any case, MFA and MOFCOM play a supportive role in providing local 
information and leading shopping delegations, but the main actor to forge business relations is 
the actual enterprises.  
Competition is not rare between SOEs in foreign markets, either in bidding or market 
share. They also compete for the “preferred bidder” status with officials at home (The Economist, 
2010). Sometimes one Chinese SOE cooperates with foreign companies to compete with another 
Chinese SOE. For instance, China Railway Construction, together with CITIC and a Japanese 
company, beat China Construction in an Algeria project, although the latter had had long-term 
presence in Algeria. CNPC, together with a Malaysian and an American company, beat Sinopec 
in a Sudan oil pipe project bid in 2005 in a vicious price war, although Sinopec had cultivated the 
market for ten years (Ren and Wang, 2004). Sometimes competition between Chinese companies 
becomes so vicious that the local diplomatic mission tries to interfere to stop their malicious 
competition. 
It is a foreign policy concern amongst western countries that China’s is actively investing 
in “problematic” countries — countries with high political risk, anti-West, or “rogue states”. 
Chinese companies and academics claim that this is because a market exists in places that the 
West has not occupied. It is argued in scholarly work that technology is another determining 
factor behind Chinese oil companies’ preference of onshore locations. Besides, failed M&A 
attempts in western countries, such as CNOOC’s failed bid for Unocal, have had a significant 
impact on the psyche of SOEs (Houser, 2008). However, dangers posed by local conflict to 
Chinese personnel and properties in unstable states such as Sudan and Libya, as well as crimes 
such as kidnappings and attacks on oil fields in Nigeria and Ethiopia, have taught the Chinese to 
reassess and distribute risk. In fact, MOFCOM discourages companies from investing in Sudan. 
The government tries not to be especially close to one side but seeks cooperation with both sides 
(interview at CASS).  
China’s tendency to sign long-term contracts of upstream resource exploration is also an 
international concern as it disturbs the global commodities market and may trigger similar 
mercantilist behaviour in other countries, thus brewing great power conflicts. That tendency is 
explained by the frustration that the price of what China buys in the global market would be 
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pushed up by western financial institutions. In order to obtain stable, relatively cheap supplies, 
Chinese companies pursue upstream contracts.  
Interviews with various academics and companies show that the government advises 
companies to sell resources back to China, but there is no such formal rule, and it allows them to 
pursue profits too on the international market, as it is considered good for government revenue. It 
is understood by resource SOEs that they should bring resources back in compliance with the 
national energy and resource strategy. However, it is often more profitable to sell domestically at 
a managed price or large demand. When the domestic price is lower than the international price, 
SOEs would sell more internationally, which in turn would force the government to raise the 
price of petrol. Otherwise, SOEs would demand subsidy from the state for them to sell 
domestically (interview at UIBE, DRC, NDRC). SOEs also have the freedom to sell their 
overseas production on the international market instead of bringing it home. For example, most 
of the equity oil produced by the three national oil companies was sold on the open market to the 
highest bidder. Despite the criticism over China’s support of Sudan, CNPC sold most of its 
Sudanese oil to Japan in 2006 (Houser 2008). A debate among the Chinese leadership, therefore, 
has been whether it is effective to rely on Chinese companies’ overseas production for energy 
security (Downs, 2004; Jakobson, 2007). 
 
Business Lobbying 
The influence of SOEs on government has increased dramatically in the past decade, and they 
have started to try to gain favourable policy for OFDI, though on a limited scale. One channel of 
influence is the “rotating door” between business and political circles, and the administrative 
ranks that some SOE managers enjoy. At present, 14 business groups are represented in the 
Central Committee of the CCP and they try to influence national policy within their fields of 
expertise (Brødsgaard, 2012). SOEs may also fund research projects at academic institutions to 
indirectly influence government policy, or organize their own research and send their findings to 
the government (interview at CICIR). 
In general, SOEs and academics feel that the government does not have systematic 
support or monitoring mechanisms, or a strategy, for outward investment in the government. To 
SOEs, it implies both great freedom to make business decisions and carry out business activities, 
and also a source of frustration as they expect more diplomatic and information support. It is 
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widely felt that the government’s policy and management of overseas investment are short-term 
oriented and lack strategy. Japan is often cited as an opposite example, whose government 
strategically and discretely used aid to pave way for investment, and helped companies avoid 
many costs. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
It is not the purpose of the paper to argue conclusively that Chinese SOEs are not controlled or 
influenced by the state in their overseas investment decisions. However, evidence suggests that 
this generally held assumption should not be taken for granted. SOEs’ profits or market share are 
often the most important consideration in their overseas activities, and usually the state regards it 
consistent with national interest. Whether it embodies the capture of the state by business 
interests, state corporatism, state capitalism or crony capitalism is beyond the scope of this paper 
and deserves further empirical research of state-business relations in China. 
Moreover, as a number of studies have suggested, developed countries have adopted 
similar measures to enhance firm competitiveness and promote national interests, for instance as 
regards natural resources supply, industrial restructuring, and foreign market access. The 
measures included financial, fiscal, information and technical support, industrial policy and 
official aid (Buckley et al., 2010; De Beule and Van Den Bulcke, 2010; UNCTAD, 2001; Solis, 
2003). Except in the case of countries under sanctions, such as Sudan, there are almost no strings 
attached by the West to its companies’ trade or investment, or to its commercial banks loans in 
Africa. China’s use of commodity-secured lines of export buyers’ credit are similar to 
commercial instruments that have been used by Japan and western banks for a long time 
(Brautigam, 2011). To gain a deeper understanding of China’s international investment, it is more 
helpful to investigate state-business relations, as that would help explain the where, how and why 
questions of China’s “going out”. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1
 For studies on China’s outward investment, see Luo et al., 1993; Zhan, 1995: 72; Cai, 1999; Wu 
and Chen, 2001; Xue and Han, 2010; Yang, 2005. For broader discussions on outward 
investment of developing countries, see for example, UNCTAD, 2005; Sauvant, 2008. 
 
2
 The report is available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/language_tips/2013cnencpctps/2013-
11/26/content_17141193.htm, accessed 11 April 2014.  
 
3
 The policy notices include “jingwai touzi xiangmu hezhun zanxing guanli banfa (Interim 
Management Procedures for the Approval of Overseas Investment Projects)”, issued by the 
NDRC; “guanyu dui guojia guli de jingwai touzi zhongdian xiangmu geiyu xindai zhichi de 
tongzhi (Notice of Giving Credit Insurance to Overseas Investment in Important Projects 
Encouraged by the Government)”  issued by the NDRC and China ExIm Bank; “guanyu kuaguo 
gongsi waihui zijin neibu yunying guanli youguan wenti de tongzhi (Notice of Internal Operation 
and Management of Foreign Exchange in International Companies)”, issued by the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange. 
 
4
 The document is available at 
http://us.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/investguide/lanmuthree/201201/20120107934992.html, 
accessed 11 April 2014. 
 
5  See UNCTAD country-specific lists of BITs and DTTs. Available at 
http://archive.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1, accessed 11 April 2014. 
 
6 See the 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment. Available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20100920_126763.htm, accessed 11 April 2014. 
 
7
 Available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html, accessed 14 April 
2014. 
 
8
 For instance, the 2002 case of Ma Fucai of PetroChina/CNPC Daqing and Li Yizhong of 
Sinopec Shengli, in Downs, 2008. 
 
9
 Available at http://www.ecdc.net.cn/events/tcdc0601/zh/tcdc7.htm, accessed 14 April 2014. 
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